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VALUE AND RATIONALITY
IN BANKRUPTCY DECISIONMAKING
DONALD R. KOROBKIN*
Too many [judges and scholars] seem to think that a bankruptcy
proceeding provides, in the main, an essentially unlimited op-
portunity to do what appears at the moment to be good, just,
or fair without regard to the reasons for having a system of
bankruptcy laws in the first place.'
Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978,2 major
corporations have tested the limits of bankruptcy relief, using
corporate reorganization in bold and unprecedented ways. Al-
though courts often have developed creative solutions in these
challenging situations,3 public and scholarly discussions have be-
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College School of Law. B.A., University of Michigan, 1978; A.M., Harvard University,
1981; J.D., University of Michigan, 1983.
In the writing of this Article, I am particularly grateful to Connie Rosati, who reviewed
several early drafts and engaged in countless discussions; her knowledge of ethical theory
has informed many of the ideas developed here. My thanks also to Jay Mootz for useful
conversations and to John Ayer, David Carlson, and Frank Kennedy for their helpful
comments on an earlier version of this Article."
1. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment
of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors
in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 97, 97 (1984).
2. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. S§ 101-1330 (1988)).
3. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 89 B.R. 555, 558-63 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988)
(disallowing punitive damage claims against Dalkon Shield manufacturer); In re Johns-
Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 757-59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (approving appointment of represen-
tative for future victims of asbestos-related disease), appeal denied, 39 B.R. 234 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
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come consumed by a common worry: that bankruptcy decision-
making may be without rational constraint.4
Motivated by this concern, Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson
developed a normative theory that specifies the limited role of
bankruptcy law and requires bankruptcy decisionmaking to con-
form with what they take to be the dictates of economic theory.5
According to this "economic account,"6 the reason "for having a
system of bankruptcy laws in the first place" 7 is to respond to
the economic problem of collecting debt 8 In particular, the bank-
ruptcy system exists to address the "common pool problem,"9
which arises when multiple creditors assert claims against a
debtor's limited pool of assets.10 This rationale for having a
bankruptcy system demands that judges be constrained from
4. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An
Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 198-202
(1989) (concluding that legislative and judicial pursuits of distributional goals threaten to
impose undue costs on bankruptcy system); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 154-58 (1990) (concluding that the closed culture of
judges and lawyers in Chapter 11 cases leads to consensual plans of reorganization that
divert assets of insolvent debtors from creditors to equity holders); Morton Mintz, When
Expediency, Not Law, Prevails, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 11, 1989, at 28 (describing how A.H.
Robins and its insurance company used the bankruptcy system to manage their liability
to Dalkon Shield claimants).
5. See generally THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986);
Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren,
54 U. Cm. L. REV. 815 (1987); Baird & Jackson, supra note 1.
6. By use of the term "economic account," I refer specifically to Baird and Jackson's
application of economic principles to bankruptcy law. Based on the normative principle
of wealth maximization, Baird and Jackson's approach conforms in important respects
with that taken by proponents of law-and-economics, including Richard Posner. See, e.g.,
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60-87 (discussing wealth maximization as
an ethical principle), 95-99 (applying the wealth-maximization principle to negligence law)
(1991). Nonetheless, their application of welfare economics may deviate from law-and-
economics in certain respects. See David G. Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 624-31 (1989) (distinguishing Baird and Jackson's
economic approach from the welfare efficiency tradition of law-and-economics and labeling
their approach as "pseudo-law-and-economics"). In any event, by the term "economic
account," I do not mean to encompass economic theory in general or any other effort
other than that of Baird and Jackson to apply economic theory to bankruptcy law.
7. Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 97.
8. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 5, at 3 ("Bankruptcy law, at its core, is debt-collection
law.").
9. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 5, at 21-27 (stating that the proper role of bankruptcy
law is to address the common pool problem).
10. See, e.g., id.; Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 97-109 (arguing that bankruptcy
law has the exclusive normative role of requiring persons with property rights against
the debtor's assets to act collectively to promote their group welfare).
BANKRUPTCY DECISIONMAKING
doing "what appears at the moment to be good, just, or fair"'
and instead make decisions that maximize economic returns. 12 By
offering a universal standard that determines the correctness of
particular decisions, the economic account promises to constrain
bankruptcy decisionmaking in rational ways.
The economic account, however, is based on a false foundation.
As I have argued elsewhere, bankruptcy law is not a response
to the purely economic problem of collecting debt; it is a response
to the larger problem of financial distress, understood as a crisis
of diverse values. 3 I have offered, in place of the economic
account, a "value-based account"'14 of bankruptcy law. According
to the value-based account, bankruptcy law exists to create a
context in which the economic and noneconomic values of all
those affected by financial distress may be expressed and some-
times recognized'1 The bankruptcy system, then, is not merely
a mechanism for reaching an optimal economic outcome for cred-
itors as a group; it is a process for rendering richer, more
informed decisions to govern the relationships of all persons
affected by financial distress.
Conceiving of bankruptcy law in these terms, however, does
not resolve the more practical concern that inspires the economic
account. We worry about arbitrariness in resolving all omplex
disputes and thus seek guidance for judicial decisionmaking. We
may want courts to "do equity," but not if doing so results in
unwise or inconsistent decisions. Although we may differ widely
on what we consider to be a good decision in bankruptcy, we
agree on the undesirability of creating a situation in which "just
anything goes." Conceiving of bankruptcy law as a response to
the problem of financial distress rather than the problem of
collecting debt may provide important insight into the reasons
why we have a bankruptcy system in the first place; yet it does
nothing, by itself, to relieve our worry about arbitrariness of
decision.
In fact, this conception may only aggravate the concern. If
bankruptcy law existed merely as a response to the problem of
maximizing the economic welfare of creditors as a group, bank-
ruptcy decisionmaking would be simple. The ideal decisionmaker
11. Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 97.
12. See sources cited supra note 10.
13. Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 717, 762-66 (1991).
14. Id. at 721.
15. See id. at 766.
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would be available for hire-a person skilled in economics. Eco-
nomic theory offers general rules that may, in principle, be
applied to render consistent and predictable decisions. The eco-
nomic account of bankruptcy law thus carries with it a method
for resolving conflicts in a way that seemingly offers an escape
from the arbitrariness we fear.
In contrast, once we view bankruptcy law as a response to a
crisis of diverse human values, we seem to be cut loose from
objectivity and certainty. We have no scientific principles for
arbitrating such disputes and must legislate ways to constrain
decisionmaking. Especially in reorganization cases, courts must
face conflicts of complex dimensions and oversee an intense
process of negotiation, administration, and litigation that may
continue for years. Although it may not be disturbing to contem-
plate that we require a decisionmaker who is more than a
Samuelson,16 it is less assuring to note that we may need a
Solomon. A decisionmaker in bankruptcy must apparently be
capable of unattainable wisdom-of resolving seemingly intrac-
table conflicts between and among fundamentally incommensu-
rable values. Under these difficult conditions, even a Solomon
may be capable of doing nothing more than "what appears at the
moment to be good, just, or fair," leaving us with the worry
about the consistency of decisionmaking.
The introduction of the value-based account of bankruptcy law
thus seems to lead to an unhappy dilemma. Either we limit
bankruptcy courts to the method of the economic account, in
which case we must accept decisions that are insensitive to the
diverse human values that find expression in financial distress,
or we allow such courts to recognize a plurality of values, in
which case we license a situation in which "just anything goes."
It seems that we are forced to choose between the economic
account's method of decisionmaking that is "rational" but not
always "good," and value-based methods of decisionmaking that
may be "good" but are not "rational."
This Article demonstrates that the above dilemma is a false
one and that conceiving of bankruptcy law under the value-based
account does not require a view of bankruptcy decisionmaking
as without rational constraint. Part I shows that the economic
account's reductive method for bankruptcy decisionmaking is not
as rational as it appears. As an example, Part I focuses on a
16. I refer to the Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Samuelson.
[Vol. 33:333336
BANKRUPTCY DECISIONMAKING
critical decision in many reorganizations-whether to permit the
reorganizing debtor'7 to reject its continuing obligations under a
collective-bargaining agreement. Rational constraints on such a
decision must be capable of resolving conflicts between diverse
and incommensurable human values arising in specific contexts
in a bankruptcy case. Part I shows that, because the economic
account fails even to recognize these diverse values, it lacks the
capacity to resolve conflicts among them. Thus, it is unsuited for
reaching decisions addressed to conflicts of this kind.
Part II elaborates on the value-based account and presents an
alternative model for bankruptcy decisionmaking. Under this
model, bankruptcy decisionmaking is constrained in ways that
allow a full response to financial distress as a human crisis. This
Part argues that bankruptcy decisionmaking is rationally con-
strained in the same ways that individual decisionmaking about
a person's life is rationally constrained. Just as a person is
rationally able to resolve conflicts regarding her future aims in
life, so the bankruptcy court can rationally resolve conflicts about
the aims of the corporate enterprise in financial distress. Drawing
upon recent philosophical literature on the nature of persons,
autonomy, and rational planning, Part H describes the kinds of
constraints that are capable of providing rational guidance in
bankruptcy decisionmaking. It then displays the operation and
interaction of the constraints upon a court's decision whether to
allow a reorganizing debtor to reject a collective-bargaining
agreement.
This Article reveals bankruptcy decisionmaking to be both
creative and rationally constrained, thus contributing to a nor-
mative explanation of bankruptcy law that vindicates its basic
structure and fundamental practices. At the same time, the
Article sketches a systematic but nonreductive basis for evalu-
ating bankruptcy law and decisionmaking-the beginnings of a
theoretical framework for bankruptcy criticism.
I. THE ECONoMIc ACCOUNT AND RATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON
BANKRUPTCY DECISIONMAKING
What constitutes rational decisionmaking depends on the prob-
lem to which the decisionmaking must respond. Our common
17. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor-in-possession or the trustee, as represen-
tative for the estate, has the authority to reject or assume executory contracts of the
historical debtor. 11 U.S.C. S 365(a) (1988); see also id. S 1107(a) (debtor-in-possession has
rights of trustee). For convenience, however, I will refer to the debtor-in-possession or
the trustee generically as the "reorganizing debtor" or the "debtor."
1992]
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experience testifies to this fact. To count the pages of Milton's
Paradise Lost, for instance, may be a rational way of deciding
whether the poem is too long to finish on a forty-minute train
ride; however, it is not a rational way of deciding whether it is
the greatest work in English literature. A model of rational
decisionmaking must rest on a diagnosis of an underlying problem
and be appropriate to the nature of the problem to be addressed.
In developing its model of bankruptcy decisionmaking, the
economic account offers a diagnosis of the underlying problem to
which bankruptcy law responds. It views bankruptcy law as a
response to the economic problem of collecting debt and, in
particular, as existing to solve the common pool problem that
arises when diverse co-owners assert conflicting claims against a
common pool of assets.18 According to the economic account,
bankruptcy law forces diverse creditors, which it considers to be
co-owners of the insolvent debtor's assets, to work together
toward a collective solution. 19 It forces these diverse co-owners
to behave as if they were a sole owner of assets who, consistent
with economic assumptions, would use the assets in a way that
secures the best economic return.20
Based on this diagnosis, the economic account first defines a
standard by which to evaluate any bankruptcy decision: the
"correct" outcome maximizes economic returns for creditors as
a group.21 It then provides guidelines for constraining judicial
deliberation so as to increase the likelihood of a decision that
will be consistent with this wealth-maximizing standard.22
18. See sources cited supra note 10.
19. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 5, at 17 (stating that "[b]ankruptcy provides a way
to override the creditors' pursuit of their own remedies and make them work together").
20. See, e.g., id. at 10-14; Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 105-09.
21. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 210-13; Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in
Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 728-29 (1984) [hereinafter Jackson, Avoiding Powers in
Bankruptcy]. Proponents of the economic account have acknowledged that, as a descriptive
matter, the wealth-maximization standard fails to account for "persistent and systematic
redistributional impulses" in bankruptcy law. 4ackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 156.
Although Jackson and Scott have developed a "common disaster" component to account
for these impulses, id. at 157, they maintain, as a normative matter, that maximizing
assets for the benefit of creditors remains the "central goal" in bankruptcy law, id. at
156 n.2.
22. Jackson summarizes the economic account's normative strategy in the following
terms:
In analyzing bankruptcy law, as with any other body of law, it helps to start
by identifying first principles. Those principles can then be developed by
defining their potential operation in the existing social, economic, and legal
world to identify precisely what bankruptcy law should encompass, how it
can accomplish its goals, and the constraints on its ability to do so.
JACKSON, supra note 5, at 2-3 (footnote omitted).
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Suppose, for example, that a corporation files for reorganization
and soon thereafter refuses to comply with a provision of an
unexpired collective-bargaining agreement requiring wage in-
creases for its employees. Instead, the reorganizing debtor asks
the court to allow it to reject the agreement, arguing that to
grant these pay increases would detrimentally affect its chances
for reorganization. In opposition, the employees' union maintains
that the agreement expressly provides that it will remain binding
on the debtor in the event of the debtor's filing for reorganization.
The union further contends that the debtor's unilateral rejection
of the agreement is prohibited by the policies and provisions of
the National Labor Relations Act.23 What should the court decide?
The economic account offers a determinate answer to this
question. Because bankruptcy law has. the unique function of
solving the common pool problem and thereby maximizing the
economic welfare of diverse co-owners of the debtor's assets, the
court should make whichever decision will have this wealth-
maximizing effect 4 But which decision will have this result? The
economic account maintains that if a party has rights in a bank-
ruptcy context that it does not enjoy outside of bankruptcy, such
a party may have particular incentive for acting in a way that
is contrary to the economic welfare of the creditors as a group.25
The court thus must deliberate as to which decision will best
preserve the rights of the parties under nonbankruptcy law26 or,
at least, the "relative value" of those nonbankruptcy rights.27
If the court observes these guidelines, it will reach what the
economic account views as the correct decision-to deny the
debtor's request for rejection of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment.m The debtor has no unilateral right to disaffirm this kind
23. 29 U.S.C. S§ 151-159 (1988).
24. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 5, at 23-27 (arguing that bankruptcy law is justified
in overriding nonbankruptcy rights only if it maximizes the welfare of creditors as a
group).
25. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 106-09 (contending that altering
nonbankruptcy entitlements creates incentives for persons to act in ways that are contrary
to the interests of creditors as a group); Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, supra
note 21, at 730.31 (stating that the risk of creating perverse incentives is the "problem
that makes such rule changes normatively undesirable").
26. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 100 ("Bankruptcy law should change a
substantive nonbankruptcy rule only when doing so preserves the value of assets for the
group of investors holding rights in them.").
27. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 5, at 28-29 (indicating that, although it may be
impossible to preserve nonbankruptcy rights, the bankruptcy system should at least
protect the relative value of those rights).
28. See, e.g., id. at 111-13; Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 173, 185-86.
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of agreement under nonbankruptcy law, and therefore, according
to the economic account, the debtor should not be allowed to do
so simply because it has filed a petition for reorganization. 9 A
debtor that is able to repudiate a collective-bargaining agreement
only in bankruptcy may well choose bankruptcy for that reason
alone, at the expense of the economic. welfare of creditors as a
group.30
This method for bankruptcy decisionmaking constrains the
court's deliberation toward a determinate resolution of the dis-
pute. The question remains, however, whether the economic
account constrains the court's decision in a rational way. In some
sense, of course, the constraint is rational, because the economic
account's method of decisionmaking allows consistent decisions,
and it promotes one value that is obviously important in bank-
ruptcy cases. Nonetheless, the rationality of the economic account
ultimately depends upon whether it has correctly diagnosed the
problem to which bankruptcy law responds.
This consideration is critical. As I have argued elsewhere,
because the economic account ignores those aspects of bankruptcy
law that promote noneconomic outcomes as independent values,
it misconstrues bankruptcy law as a response to a thoroughly
economic problem. 1 This misdiagnosis leads proponents of the
economic account to repudiate aspects of bankruptcy law that
are most expressive of its unique character and history-in
particular, its provisions for corporate reorganization. 32 Because
the economic account misidentifies the problem to which bank-
ruptcy law responds, it also lacks the resources to explain im-
portant bankruptcy rules, including the rule of equality of
distribution among similarly situated creditors.3
29. See sources cited supra note 28. The economic account reaches this conclusion based
on the assumption that the employees covered by a collective-bargaining agreement "may
be much closer to an entity holding a full-fledged property (and priority) right." JACKSON,
supra note 5, at 111. If proponents of the economic account were instead to conclude that
rights under a collective-bargaining agreement are closer to the rights of an ordinary
contract party under nonbankruptey law, they would presumably reach a different
conclusion on the question of whether rejection should be allowed. See, e.g., id. at 112
(basing opposition to rejection of a collective-bargaining agreement on the assumption
that nonbankruptcy law affords special rights to employees under collective-bargaining
agreements).
30. As Baird notes, "[olne cannot think that a firm should be able to repudiate a
collective bargaining agreement in bankruptcy, but not elsewhere, and then be surprised
if a firm chooses to use bankruptcy to repudiate a collective bargaining agreement and
for no other reason." Baird, supra note 28, at 185 (footnote omitted).
31. See Korobkin, supra note 13, at 732-35.
32. See id. at 739-40.
33. See id. at 735-39.
[Vol. 33:333
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As an alternative, I have developed the value-based account of
bankruptcy law, which rests on a larger understanding of the
problem to which that law responds. According to the value-
based account, bankruptcy law is a response to the problem of
financial distress, understood as a crisis of diverse human values,
only some of which are economic. ' Financial distress encompasses
not only the debtor and its creditors but extends to the whole
network of persons who suffer the effects of the debtor's financial
troubles. In contrast to the economic problem of collecting debt,
financial distress implicates a plurality of human values-moral,
political, personal, and social, as well as economic.3 5
In answering bankruptcy questions, then, the court must re-
solve conflicts among such diverse values. The court's decision
to allow a debtor to reject a collective-bargaining agreement will
have important economic implications, extending not only to the
debtor's management and union, but to shareholders, nonunion-
ized employees, and creditors. It will determine which employees
will keep and which will lose their jobs, which creditors will be
paid, and how much the payment will be. The court's decision
will also have moral, political, social, and personal meaning to
these various individuals and may affect the lives of their families
and the life of their community.
In view of the plurality of values at stake, the court may be
pulled in different directions. A party to a collective-bargaining
agreement has special rights and remedies under the National
Labor Relations Act,- which reflect values associated with pro-
tecting employee welfare. Still, the court may be justifiably
concerned that recognizing these values would be disastrous. To
bar the reorganizing debtor from rejecting an agreement as
important as a collective-bargaining agreement may so restrict
its financial and operational options as to sabotage the efforts of
the business to survive. The collapse of the business would
sacrifice the economic and noneconomic values of all the other
participants in the debtor's financial distress -including creditors,
nonunionized employees, shareholders, and interested members
of the larger community. Business collapse would even undercut
the interests of those unionized workers that collective-bargaining
agreements are designed to protect.
34. See id. at 766.
35. See id. at 764-65.
36. 29 U.S.C. SS 151-169 (1988).
19921
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On the other hand, authorizing the rejection of collective-
bargaining agreements may frustrate important values which the
collective-bargaining process promotes. This process offers labor
and management a means of self-regulation in the workplace and
prevents the "economic warfare" that may otherwise result from
unilateral modifications and terminations. a7 In fact, allowing the
reorganizing debtor to reject a collective-bargaining agreement
may, in any particular case, so destabilize the relationship be-
tween management and its unionized employees as to threaten
the ultimate realization of a successful reorganization. Allowing
such rejections also might inspire future debtors to use the
bankruptcy system strategically to avoid such agreements and
thereby rid themselves of troublesome unions.
The participants in financial distress may express their diverse
values and concerns in these larger terms, or speak more per-
sonally. The management's desire to reject the agreement derives
partly from its calculation of economic utility, but also from
obligations that individual members of that management owe to
each other, their dependents, and their creditors. Similarly, the
union leaders owe their membership specific obligations that may
be expressed in their personal concern for its well-being, moral
outrage at what they perceive as management's betrayal, or
political self-defense. The resolution of this dispute will have
important personal meaning for these various participants.
In reaching a decision that will have such a critical impact on
the lives of these participants and on the bankruptcy case as a
whole, a court faces the unavoidably difficult task of resolving a
conflict between dramatically divergent values. This kind of con-
flict constitutes what philosopher Thomas Nagel referred to as
a "practical conflit"38-a clash between values that cannot be
reduced to a single value. 9 The decisionmaker seeking to resolve
a conflict of this kind lacks a single scale on which values may
be rationally measured and balanced. 40
The economic account is not attuned to this problem. The
economic account's method of resolving disputes is reductive: it
is premised on the existence of a single scale on which competing
values may be compared. It adopts a standard of economic utility
37. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981) (indicating
the importance of the National Labor Relations Act in promoting corporate self-gover-
nance in the workplace).
38. THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 128-29 (1979).
39. See generally id. at 128-41 (examining the nature of "practical conflicts").
40. Id. at 128-32.
342 [Vol. 33:333
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and directs the court to use this standard as the sole basis for
its deliberation. The court ultimately must evaluate its options
by determining which option would maximize the economic wel-
fare of creditors as a group. Thus, in deciding whether to allow
the debtor to reject a collective-bargaining agreement, the court
must either reduce noneconomic values to economic terms, or
ignore these values altogether.
This reductive method guides judicial deliberation in a way
that has little relationship to the diverse values that so urgently
seek recognition in this context. It neglects not only the non-
economic values associated with upholding collective-bargaining
agreements, but also the diverse values that may be frustrated
if the reorganization ultimately fails. This method is entirely
unsuited to guide decisionmaking that must resolve practical
conflicts among incommensurable values. As a method for decid-
ing bankruptcy questions, it may not be ds irrational as counting
pages to decide the greatness of Paradise Lost, but it displays a
similar brand of irrationality. It is insensitive to the full range
of values at issue in the problem to be addressed.
What then is the alternative? Leaving judges to make decisions
based entirely on "what appears at the moment to be good, just,
or fair" is no solution. Lacking a method for resolving disputes,
a court may gravitate toward whichever voice seems most com-
pelling at the time, with too little regard for the legal merits of
its decision. In an important sense, to make a decision in this
way only perpetuates the problem that bankruptcy law seeks to
redress. In financial distress, various parties assert conflicting
and unorchestrated demands that undercut their ability to obtain
a larger perspective on the crisis and its consequences.4' Allowing
judges to make bankruptcy decisions based on whichever demand
happens to grip them at the momentwould be replacing one
kind of unorchestrated decisionmaking for another. Although
decisionmaking of this kind may lead to justice in a particular
case, as a general practice, it is more likely to lead to inconsistent
and often unwise outcomes.
This kind of decisionmaking returns us to our central worry.
There may be good reasons for rejecting the view that bank-
ruptcy law is merely a response to the economic problem of
collecting debt, but does viewing bankruptcy law as a response
to the problem of financial distress commit us to licensing a
41. See Korobkin, supra note 13, at 763-66.
343.1992]
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situation in which "just anything goes"? Is it possible to constrain
bankruptcy decisionmaking in rational ways that are suited to
the particular characteristics of financial distress?
II. A VALUE-BASED MODEL OF BANKRUPTCY DECISIONMAKING
A. The Formulation of a Rational Plan of Life
The economic account defines what it views as rationality in
bankruptcy decisionmaking by a simple analogy to the case of
the individual economic actor: bankruptcy decisionmaking should
have the effect of forcing diverse co-owners of a common pool of
assets to behave as if they were a sole owner of that pool.42
Consistent with economic assumptions, such a sole owner would
act in rational and self-interested ways, making business decisions
that maximize the economic return from the sale of the pool.43
Because the economic account has misdiagnosed the problem to
which bankruptcy law responds,44 this analogy has limited force.
Bankruptcy decisionmaking is addressed not to the common pool
problem, but to the problem of financial distress;45 and those
parties affected by financial distress are not dehistoricized eco-
nomic actors, but actual persons moved by diverse human values
and concerns.
Nonetheless, in developing a value-based model of bankruptcy
decisionmaking, we might follow the economic account's lead in
analogizing to individual decisionmaking. Rather than studying
economic theories of rational choice, however, we might consider
the workings of an actual person's decisionmaking; we might
thereby reconstruct the analogy to incorporate our understanding
of bankruptcy law as a response' to a problem involving diverse
human values. After all, a person often faces critical decisions in
her own life, sometimes involving larger issues about personal
identity and goals. Faced with the task of deciding among diverse
aims and values, a person is capable of reaching decisions through
a process that seems constrained in rational ways. As a means
of defining rationality in decisionmaking under the value-based
42. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 5, at 22-24; Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 105-
09.
43. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 1, at 104-05.
44. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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account, we might first consider what kinds of constraints operate
in personal decisionmaking.
Imagine a person who faces a choice between possible careers.
She may confront, for example, a choice between becoming either
a professional musician or a lawyer. Her decisionmaking does not
merely involve a choice between occupations, but also between
ways of living her life.46 She may view her choice as between an
unconventional life as a musician, which may allow her to retain
greater control over how she spends her time but offers no
financial security, or a relatively conventional life as a lawyer,
which may provide financial security but at the cost of the
freedom to pursue her own projects at her own pace. Her choice
will permit her to pursue and develop certain kinds of activities
and interests while excluding others. In an important way, she
is presented with the task of formulating a plan for her life. By
what process does this person choose among these diverse aims
and decide upon a rational life plan that allows her to move
forward in a constructive way?
As a start, she may have certain strongly held values that are
not put into question by the decisionmaking. She may know, for
example, that she does not want to become anything other than
a musician or a lawyer; and, whatever she becomes, she wants
at some point to have children and serve as a good role model
for their development. These strongly held values express and
rank specific and more general aims, acting as constraints on her
decisionmaking process. Let us call these "normative constraints."
Guided by normative constraints, she comes to her decisionmak-
ing with certain aims already settled and with some sense of
their relative importance. She thus chooses not among limitless
and unordered aims, but only among those aims that are the
most likely and compelling candidates for recognition.
In some cases, these normative constraints may determine
most, if not all, of a person's important aims. A person's strongly
held values may be such that she already knows what she wants
to do with her life. For example, although having the option to
become a lawyer, she may know that she prefers to become a
professional musician. She also may have settled on various other
aims related to this career goal. Although her aims are relatively
46. In examining the question of why persons become lawyers, Anthony Kronman has
described this aspect of making such a career choice as "peculiarly bifocal," involving
"the compassionate survey of alternatives viewed simultaneously from a distance." See
Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 835, 853 (1987).
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settled, she still requires a life plan for achieving them and must
deliberate to formulate such a plan.
In particular, her deliberation may serve one or more of three
basic functions. First, she may deliberate to discover the practical
means of achieving her aims as a musician-an "instrumental"
function of deliberation: In planning her career as a musician,
she may consider whether it would be better for her to attend
a formal music college or to continue to train herself and practice
with her friends. Second, her deliberation may serve a "clarifying
function" that illuminates the content of her settled aims. She
may seek to determine, for example, what kind of musician to
become-a studio or nightclub musician, a composer, or a teacher-
or what being a musician means to her.
Third, because she will have various activities and interests
even while she has generally settled aims, she may deliberate as
to how to organize her activities in a way that will allow her
realize those aims. For example, although she may enjoy going
to movies on the weekends, she may deliberate as to whether to
spend more of that time practicing or to take an evening job
which would allow her to support herself while pursuing a musical
education. As John Rawls noted, "[tihe aim of deliberation" is to
"find that plan which best organizes our activities and influences
the formation of our subsequent wants so that [our] aims and
interests can be fruitfully combined into one scheme of conduct."47
In this instance, deliberation serves a "coordinating" function.
By performing these various functions, deliberation moves the
person toward formulating a rational plan of life. But what
determines the rationality of her deliberation? As one approach
to answering this question, we might theorize about how a person
might go about choosing a plan for a good life and, as Rawls did,
specify rational guidelines in the form of "principles of rational
choice." 48
For example, according to Rawls, one principle of rational
choice dictates that, if a person is faced with a choice between
alternative plans with roughly the same aims, she should adopt
the plan that realizes those aims with the least expenditure of
means and that achieves the aims to the fullest extent.49 Rawls
referred to this as the principle of "effective means." 50 A second
47. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 410-11 (1971).
48. See id. at 408.
49. Id. at 411-12.
50. Id. at 411.
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principle-that of "inclusiveness,"5' 1 holds that a person should
select the plan that allows her to realize more of her aims.52
According to a third principle, of "greater likelihood,"53 a person
choosing between two plans with roughly the same aims should
choose the plan that is more likely to achieve those aims.5 Let
us call such constraints on how a person deliberates "deliberative
constraints."
Naturally, the person formulating a life plan for becoming a
musician will not research Rawls' theories of rational planning
as a means of guiding her decision. Still, she may seek advice
from friends, parents, mentors, and professional counselors. Their
advice may impose constraints on her deliberation, which thus
represent deliberative constraints. The advice, if rational, will
effectively constitute concrete instances of principles of rational
choice. If the person is trying to decide whether to move to New
York City to train with the best musicians in the country or to
stay in her hometown and continue to practice with her friends,
a rational advisor will counsel her to consider which route will
allow her to accomplish her aims as a musician to the fullest
extent, realize additional aims she might have, or be most likely
to allow her to achieve her aims. Such advice will help her
formulate a life plan that allows her to realize her aims as a
musician.
The principles of rational choice discussed thus far, however,
do not exhaust the principles relevant to her decisionmaking. For
one thing, those principles are neutral as to possible variations
in the importance of her aims. For example, although she may
want to get the best musical training possible, she also may fear
that the expense of such training will prevent her from taking
luxurious vacations for the next few years. An additional principle
of rational choice guides her decisionmaking in the presence of
conflicting aims of varying degrees of importance. According to
the principle of "intensity," she should adopt the plan that is
most likely to realize her most important aims, even if it frus-
trates less important aims that she might have.55
Yet, in formulating a life plan, this person cannot know all her
aims at the outset and, as circumstances change and she gains
51. Id. at 412.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 412-13.
55. Rawls described this principle but did not give it a name. See id. at 416-17.
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more information, she may develop other aims. She may be
certain that she wants to become a professional musician but be
uncertain whether she would like to specialize in classical music
or jazz. It is rational, therefore, that she should plan specifically
for the present while not unduly restricting her options in the
more distant future.5 Guided by this principle, she may decide
to engage in training that will allow her to develop her abilities
in both areas. Again, following Rawls, such planning is consistent
with a principle of "postponement. ' 57
Ideally, a person would want to continue to deliberate as to
her life plan until she gained command of all relevant facts and
understood what each alternative would bring. She would want
to know what it would be like to live a life as a musician
specializing in classical music and also know what it would be
like specializing in jazz. Unfortunately, no one is capable of
omniscience; at some point, she must settle on a choice. Her
deliberation thus must be consistent with an additional principle
of rational choice, of "relative benefit": "She should deliberate
up to the point where the likely benefits from improving [her]
plan are just worth the time and effort of reflection."'
In formulating a rational life plan, then, a person is subject to
two kinds of constraints: normative constraints, which express
and order her aims, and deliberative constraints, which guide
her deliberation and include concrete instances of the principles
of rational choice. Under the guidance of these constraints, a
person may make decisions without experiencing any real crisis
in decisionmaking. If her strongly held values do not conflict and
relevant normative constraints- direct her toward relatively set-
tled aims, she need deliberate only as to how to accomplish those
aims-whether that involves arranging practical means, clarifying
the content of the aims, or coordinating their fulfillment. Al-
though her deliberation may be challenging, she suffers no crisis
in personal autonomy so long as she maintains the capacity to
regulate herself toward aims that she herself established.
If her strongly held values conflict, however, the person con-
fronts a different situation. She experiences a crisis, as applicable
normative constraints direct her toward seemingly incompatible
sets of aims. She may admire artistic creativity and be drawn to
a career as a musician; yet she also may worry about widespread
56. Id. at 410.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 418. The label "relative benefit" is my own.
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poverty, admire selfless action, and be drawn to a life as a lawyer
representing poorer clients. She faces a conflict between strongly
held and incommensurable values, each of which pulls her in a
different direction. This crisis may lead her sporadically to pursue
divergent aims. If she is unable to resolve this crisis, she may
find, years later, that she has achieved nothing of what she
desires. To protect herself from suffering this eventual fate, she
requires a way of moving forward, of deliberating toward a
rational life plan. How does the person in such a crisis avoid a
decisionmaking process in which "just anything goes"?
Recent philosophical discussions of free will and the nature of
persons have explored the process of deliberation by which a
person addresses a crisis in personal autonomy. 9 For example,
Harry Frankfurt argued that persons have the distinctive capac-
ity for stepping back from themselves to engage in a reflective
commentary on the desirability of their conflicting desires or
aims.60 In other words, persons are capable of deciding to identify
with certain aims while excluding or subordinating others. 1
Through this ongoing reflective process, a person contributes
toward the creation of a "self'; she exercises control over who
she is and what kind of person she will be.62
A person's self-reflective deliberation differs in an important
way from ordinary deliberation that occurs when aims are rela-
tively settled. Self-reflective deliberation is not directed to for-
mulating the means for achieving settled aims but to formulating
the aims themselves.0 The person thus addresses her crisis in
personal autonomy by seeking to restore her capacity to regulate
herself toward ends that she herself has chosen. 4
Because self-reflective deliberation operates only in the absence
of settled aims, it serves no instrumental function of arranging
the practical means for settled aims. By serving a clarifying
59. See, e.g., HARRY G. FRANKFURT, Identification and Wholeheartedness, in THE IMPOR-
TANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 159, 159-76 (1988); CHARLES TAYLOR, WMat is Human
Agency?, in HuMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE 15, 15-20 (1985); Connie Sue Rosati, Self-
Invention and the Good 78-116 (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Michigan).
60. See HARRY G. FRANKFURT, Freedom of the Wi and the Concept of a Person, in THE
IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT, supra note 59, at 11, 12.
61. See FRANKFURT, IdentifIcation and Wholeheartedness, supra note 59, at 166.
62. See id- at 170-72.
63. Cf id. at 172-75 (comparing self-reflection with other kinds of decisionmaking).
64. Cf. id. at 170-72 (describing a person's self-reflection as defining "the intrapsychic
constraints and boundaries with respect to which a person's autonomy may be threatened
even by his own desires").
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function, however, such deliberation may lead the person to
understand the meaning of her competing aims. Divided between
strongly held values that pull her toward incompatible sets of
aims as a musician and a lawyer, the person must step back and
evaluate the desirability of the respective aims. Ultimately, she
must either find a way of integrating these incommensurable
aims into her life plan or exclude some of the aims entirely.
Through deliberation, she hopes to clarify the nature of these
aims, their significance to her, and their relative priority. She
thus moves toward settling her aims and ultimately formulating
a rational life plan.
Her attempt to clarify her aims may not lead to a final settling
of those aims. She may be leaning toward one career choice or
the other, but be unsure about what she really wants; or she
may remain completely divided. In either case, she wants to leave
open her option to decide upon her aims at some indefinite future
time and, consistent with the principle of postponement,6 5 does
not want to do anything today that might foreclose an important
possibility later. She wishes to move forward toward a final
resolution of her crisis while still deliberating on her final deci-
sion.
At the same time, she recognizes that she may incur some risk
in prolonging her deliberation and not wholeheartedly identifying
with aims to become either a musician or a lawyer. If she is
going to realize her most important aims in either career, she
must devote significant time to activities related to the achieve-
ment of these aims. If she spends too much time in activities
related to one set of aims, she may undercut her efforts to
succeed in the other. Consistent with the principle of relative
benefit,66 she should thus deliberate as to her aims only so long
as the likely benefits from improving her life plan are worth the
costs of continued reflection.
The person faces the challenge of coordinating her various
activities to realize a complex set of aims. Her self-reflective
deliberation serves this coordinating function, allowing her to
reach a creative solution to her problem. She may decide to
attend law school part-time while also continuing her training as
a musician; or she may decide to work at a lawyer's office for a
limited time to find out whether legal work is likely to satisfy
her, while earning money to finance her continuing musical ed-
65. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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ucation. Through continued deliberation over the course of months
or years, she may regulate the mix of her activities in construc-
tive ways, adjusting her commitments to increase the likelihood
of achieving her most important aims, whatever those aims might
turn out to be. In the process, she further clarifies those aims
and perhaps revises their relative priority. Such revisions intro-
duce new challenges for coordination, and the deliberation may
continue.
Despite all this reflection, however, the person's decisionmak-
ing must remain, to some degree, indeterminate. Although certain
life plans may not be suited to a person, it is not the case that
only one life plan will be rational. If the person decides to become
a musician and has a fulfilling life, it does not mean that she
would have been an unfulfilled lawyer. This kind of indeterminacy
in the decisionmaking process does not render "irrational" the
process or the outcome.
The person's decisionmaking process is to be considered ra-
tional not because it is constrained by some absolute standard
that leads to a determinate outcome. Rather, the rationality of
her decisionmaking flows from her following an ongoing proce-
dure of reflection that, consistent with applicable normative and
deliberative constraints, clarifies and coordinates her aims in
meaningful ways and helps her to achieve the aims that she
ultimately chooses.67 Such a procedure is expressive of personal
autonomy; if carried out, it thereby translates into a proper
outcome.6 Let us call this method "procedural rationality." Unlike
the determinate rationality of the absolute standard, procedural
rationality is suited to the human crisis that the person seeks to
address.
B. Rationality in Bankruptcy Decisionmaking Under the Value-
Based Account
In overseeing a corporate bankruptcy case, a court addresses
a human crisis that is similar to the crisis that a person faces in
67. I borrowed the concept of procedural rationality from RAWLS, supra note 47, at 84-
89. Rawls distinguished between "perfect procedural justice:' i& at 85, which applies if
"there is an independent standard for deciding which outcome is just," id., and "pure
procedural justice," id. at 86, which requires the existence of "a correct or fair procedure
such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the
procedure has been properly followed." Id.
68. Id.
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deciding among divergent aims and desiresP9 A corporation is a
collective enterprise that, in the context of financial distress,
struggles for direction. The various constituents of that enter-
prise-secured and unsecured creditors, shareholders, manage-
ment, employees, and interested members of the larger
community-seek recognition of incommensurable values. They
assert demands that pull the corporate enterprise toward diverse
and often incompatible aims. Left unchecked, these participants
will bring dire consequences to the corporation and to each other.
The corporation as an enterprise thus suffers what might be
viewed as a crisis in "collective autonomy." Like a person radi-
cally divided between possible lives, the collective enterprise has
lost the capacity to regulate itself toward chosen aims.
The bankruptcy system offers a means for addressing this
crisis. It empowers a court in bankruptcy to exercise control
over unruly demands, orchestrate their expression, and mediate
their resolution. Bankruptcy decisionmaking thus performs the
role of supplying the reflective and deliberative capacity that the
enterprise currently lacks. The court, in conjunction with the
participants in financial distress, undergoes a procedure of re-
flection by which the fundamental aims of the enterprise may be
debated, shaped, and ultimately decided. Bankruptcy decision-
making moves the participants toward a "long-term plan" that
redefines the moral, political, social, and economic aims of the
enterprise.
The bankruptcy "estate,"70 a legal entity removed from the
historical debtor, serves as the medium by which the aims of the
enterprise are defined and redefined. 71 The various participants,
by seeking recognition of their individual demands in the context
of a bankruptcy case, each present competing visions of what
the values of the estate should be.72 They contribute to the
rehabilitative process through which the enterprise establishes
its aims and thus recovers its collective autonomy.
In supervising this process, the court has a complex task. It
must confront practical conflicts that pervade the bankruptcy
69. In discussing the role of judgment in politics, Kronman has suggested a similar
comparison: "The different possible futures that an institution faces at every critical
juncture in its history resemble the different ways of life between which an individual
must choose at certain decisive moments in his own career." Kronman, supra note 46, at
860.
70. 11 U.S.C. S 541(a) (1988) (defining "estate" as "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case").
71. See Korobkin, supra note 13, at 770.
72. See id. at 770-71.
[Vol. 33:333
BANKRUPTCY DECISIONMAKING
case and resolve those conflicts without full knowledge of the
long-term consequences of its decision or even of all the aims
that the enterprise eventually might seek to realize. Despite the
magnitude of the court's task, however, it is not the case that
"just anything goes." Bankruptcy decisionmaking is subject to
identifiable constraints that lead the court toward rational solu-
tions to complex problems.
To begin with, legislative and judicially created rules reflect
strongly held values, which exclude certain kinds of aims from
consideration and, in particular and varied contexts, express and
order specific and more general aims. These rules thus embody
normative constraints, requiring judicial recognition of aims of
various kinds. Those aims include, among others, promoting fair-
ness to and among claimants,73 avoiding the adverse consequences
of business failure,74 increasing distributions to creditors,75 gen-
erally respecting rights and expectations arising under substan-
tive nonbankruptcy law,76 and preventing debtor fraud.7 Although
participants in financial distress may assert demands expressive
of diverse and incommensurable values, those demands are eli-
gible for recognition only if they are consistent with some nor-
mative constraint. In identifying and ordering recognizable aims,
normative constraints create working conditions for meaningful
deliberation.
Bankruptcy decisionmaking is also subject to deliberative con-
straints that rationally guide the court's deliberation toward
formulation of a long-term plan for realizing some combination
of eligible aims. These deliberative constraints are provided by
specific bankruptcy rules that represent concrete instances of
principles of rational choice. Constraints of this kind support the
deliberative process by performing instrumental, clarifying, and
coordinating functions. They thereby steer deliberation toward
formulating a long-term plan that, consistent with principles of
73. One of the most important aspects of this general policy of "fairness" is that of
equality of distribution among similarly situated creditors. See, e.g., Nathanson v. NLRB,
344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952) (describing "equality of distribution" as the "theme" of the
Bankruptcy Act).
74. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220, 220 (1977) ("It is more economically
efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets.").
75. See id.
76. See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 56 (1979) ("Unless some federal
interest requires a different result, there is no reason why [state law property] interests
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a
bankruptcy proceeding.").
77. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 74, at 232-33.
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rational choice, realizes those aims that are most important.
The existence of these varied normative and deliberative con-
straints explains the role of corporate reorganization as an alter-
native to liquidation. If bankruptcy relief for corporations were
restricted to liquidation of corporate assets, the bankruptcy sys-
tem would be rendered incapable of realizing many of the poten-
tially important aims that the survival of the business might
bring. It would be unable to avoid massive layoffs, to preserve
a business important to the community and the economy, or to
prevent the economic waste resulting from the forced liquidation
of assets. As a person rationally chooses the plan that realizes
more of her aims,78 so the bankruptcy system rationally creates
conditions in which a business may survive as a viable concern,
if its survival will allow fulfillment of aims that would otherwise
be lost if the business collapsed.
Of course, in some instances, it would be irrational for bank-
ruptcy decisionmaking to move toward a long-term plan of re-
organization, because furthering the aims associated with the
viability of the business would sacrifice more important aims.
The corporation may be beyond rescue as a financial concern, or
persons essential to its continued operation may abandon the
corporation. To pursue reorganization 
-would only raise false
hopes and waste economic resources. In such a case, it would be
rational to require that the court and the participants in financial
distress not aim for a plan of reorganization but another kind of
"long-term plan" - that includes the liquidation of assets and
distribution of proceeds to claimants. Nonetheless, affording the
possibility for corporate reorganization gives flexibility to the
court, in conjunction with the participants, to formulate which-
ever kind of long-term plan is suited to the characteristics of the
bankruptcy case.
The rationality of bankruptcy decisionmaking, then, does not
depend on whether the outcome of the bankruptcy case satisfies
some absolute standard measured in reductive terms. Whether
the bankruptcy process culminates in reorganization or liquida-
tion, the rationality of bankruptcy decisionmaking derives from
having complied with a procedure of reflection that is consistent
with normative and deliberative constraints. Bankruptcy deci-
sionmaking thus displays procedural rationality.79 If the court in
its decisionmaking complies with the procedure and its con-
78. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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straints, the outcome of the bankruptcy case is thereby rational.
From context to context, however, particular constraints may
vary in both the nature and extent of guidance they provide to
the court's decisionmaking. The bankruptcy case is comprised of
specific contexts in which participants assert demands to which
the court must answer. In certain contexts, participants may
assert demands that are consistent with strongly held values
under bankruptcy law and do not offend other strongly held
values. In those instances, normative constraints embodied in
bankruptcy law appropriately direct the court to pursue settled
aims. The court need engage only in ordinary deliberation in-
tended to arrange means of realizing these aims. Bankruptcy law
may also include particular bankruptcy rules that embody con-
crete instances of principles of rational choice, providing the
court with specific guidance in this deliberation.
Consider the court's decision whether to allow rejection of an
ordinary contract, not a collective-bargaining agreemente ° For
example, the reorganizing debtor may seek to reject a prepetition
executory contract to purchase inventory from a manufacturer.
If this contract is unprofitable to the estate, its rejection would
promote various economic and noneconomic values. It would
improve the viability of the business and increase distributions
to its creditors. In addition, treating the manufacturer's claim
for damages arising from rejection of the contract as a general
unsecured claim, rather than as a claim with any special priority,
would promote the strongly held value of equality of distribution
among unsecured creditors. Meanwhile, the manufacturer's de-
mand that the estate perform the contract or give priority to its
claim for damages would frustrate realization of these important
values 81 In this simplified example, the reorganizing debtor's
demands are fully consistent with the relevant strongly held
values recognized under bankruptcy law.
80. The following discussion regarding a debtor's rejection of an ordinary executory
contract is intended to display the most basic workings of the value-based model, and
thus presents an extremely simplified sketch of the issues implicated in such a request.
For more comprehensive discussions of the sometimes complex issues of law and policy
in this context, see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory
Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REv. 227 (1989) and Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection," 59 U. COLO. L. REv. 845 (1988).
81. The rejection of an ordinary contract generally does not offend values connected
with respecting nonbankruptcy rights. Ordinarily, nonbankruptcy law does not bar a
party from breaching a contract, although the victim of the breach then may have a right
to collect damages.
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In such an instance, Congress appropriately established nor-
mative constraints that reflect these strongly held values. Section
365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the reorganizing debtor,
subject to the court's approval, to assume or reject any executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.8 2 This rule embodies
a normative constraint that promotes the viability of the business,
freeing the reorganizing debtor to reject unprofitable contracts.
In addition, § 365(g) provides that rejection constitutes a breach
of the contract not as of the time of the court's approval, but
"immediately before the date of the filing of the [bankruptcy]
petition." Thus, the unsecured claim for damages arising from
that breach is generally equal in status to all other unsecured
claims that have arisen before the filing of the petition, promoting
aims associated with equality of distribution.
Even in this context, however, courts have sometimes denied
the debtor's request for rejection. After all, a reorganizing debtor
might misjudge what is best for the estate and the reorganization
effort. Hence, courts traditionally will not permit rejection unless
the debtor can articulate a business reason that favors that action,
the so-called "business judgment rule."' This judicially created
deliberative constraint guides courts in deciding whether the
rejection of a contract would be the most effective means of
promoting business survival and increasing distributions to cred-
itors.85 In this context, the existence of relatively clear and settled
aims simplifies the task of devising appropriate normative and
deliberative constraints to guide decisionmaking.
In other contexts, the settling of aims poses a greater chal-
lenge. Let us now return to the court's decision whether to
authorize rejection of a collective-bargaining agreement.8 Parti-
cipants on each side of the issue assert demands that are ex-
82. 11 U.S.C. 5 365(a) (1988).
83. Id § 365(g)(1).
84. See, e.g., Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re Minges), 602 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1979)
(approving of the business judgment rule as a fair and flexible approach); Carey v. Mobil
Oil Corp. (In re Tilco, Inc.), 558 F.2d 1369, 1372-73 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that a court
applying the business judgment rule must make findings as to the benefits or detriments
of the proposed rejection to the estate).
85. Section 365(a) also embodies a specific deliberative constraint that supports ordinary
deliberation in performing clarifying and coordinating functions: it creates an occasion on
which the debtor must seek the court's approval for rejection. 11 U.S.C. S 365(a). Such
an occasion provides a source of information about the current direction of the reorgan-
ization to the court and the participants. It clarifies the reorganization's more particular
aims, encourages ongoing participation in their formation, and thus generally facilitates
the court's coordination of present and possible future aims.
86. See supra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.
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pressive of strongly held values recognized under bankruptcy
law. The reorganizing debtor's rejection may be essential to
promoting a successful reorganization. Denying such rejection,
however, would realize other strongly held values of upholding
the integrity of the collective-bargaining process and preserving
substantive rights of unionized employees.
The mere existence of a conflict between strongly held values
does not prevent the rulemaker-whether it be Congress or the
rulemaking court-from settling aims once and for all. For in-
stance, Congress might decide that the aims promoted in uphold-
ing collective-bargaining agreements are clearly more important
than the aims that might be realized by allowing the reorganizing
debtor to reject the agreement. It thus might adopt a rule that
embodies an appropriate normative constraint., The effect of this
rule would be to rank one set of aims over the other-to promote
the integrity of the collective-bargaining process over achieving
successful reorganizations.
Congress also may include specific deliberative constraints in
the rule it enacts. Some legislators may argue that the denial of
a rejection may result, in certain circumstances, in the immediate
collapse of the business and the ensuing loss of union jobs, only
defeating the aims that Congress seeks to protect. Congress
therefore might enact a rule that, although generally barring
rejection, does allow the reorganizing debtor to reject the agree-
ment if denial of rejection would result in immediate liquidation
of the businessa7 This rule embodies a specific deliberative con-
straint that guides the court in locating the most effective means
for achieving the legislatively settled aims.
This kind of solution is not always feasible. Congress may
conclude that the importance of values connected with each set
of competing aims frustrates any attempt to reach a final ranking.
It may be committed to protecting the special rights of unionized
employees but may lack the will to enact a rule that undercuts
the reorganization effort in all these cases. The clash among
strongly held values may be inescapable, pointing to seemingly
incompatible sets of aims.
Congress or the rulemaking court cannot ignore the conflict.
It must confront a different task: to develop constraints that are
87. In Congress' silence and prior to the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Bildisco
& Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), certain courts in fact adopted such a rule. See, e.g.,
Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975), and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
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capable of guiding a court's decisionmaking in the absence of
settled aims. Even in the absence of settled aims, the bankruptcy
court must be able to move forward in its deliberation and
progress toward the formulation of a long-term plan. In this
regard, the bankruptcy court stands in a position analogous to
that of a person who is divided in career aims and confronts a
crisis in personal autonomy.88 The court must address the symp-
toms of the crisis of collective autonomy that constitutes financial
distress-the inability of the enterprise to regulate itself toward
chosen aims. The court must deliberate not merely to establish
means but to establish the aims themselves. By engaging in "self-
reflective" deliberation, 9 the court seeks to define which partic-
ular aims, among the eligible aims and sets of aims, to incorpo-
rate, and which to subordinate or exclude.
The court's evaluation of the relative desirability of such aims
may vary depending on the individual circumstances of a bank-
ruptcy case and the specific context in which the conflict arises.
In any one reorganization case, the variety of conflicts is vast,
and each conflict has its own salient characteristics. The meaning
of a bankruptcy court's decision to allow a particular reorganizing
debtor to reject a collective-bargaining agreement is, to this
extent, unstable and indeterminate. How can such decisionmaking
be constrained?
Of course, an omniscient, ideal Congress would be capable of
fully constraining such decisions. It would identify all the com-
binations of particular aims among which the court might choose
and then enact elaborate rules to determine the court's decision
in each possible circumstance. An actual Congress, however,
confronts its epistemic limits. It cannot know enough at the
outset to enact rules that, once and for all, constrain all important
aspects of the court's self-reflective deliberation. At least as a
starting point, it must allow the bankruptcy court sufficient
flexibility to reach a decision that responds to the characteristics
of the individual bankruptcy case.
In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,90 the Supreme Court recognized
the importance of preserving the bankruptcy court's flexibility
in decisionmaking of this kind.91 The Court rejected a rule that
88. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
90. 465 U.S. 513.
91. In addition to addressing the issue discussed here, the Court in Bildisco also
addressed the question of whether the NLRB may find a debtor-in-possession guilty of
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would have permitted rejection of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment only if necessary to prevent immediate business collapse 2
This rule, the Court stated, "subordinates the multiple, competing
considerations underlying a Chapter 11 reorganization" to the
single consideration of avoiding the corporation's liquidation.93
Such a definitive ranking of aims is "fundamentally at odds with
the policies of flexibility and equity built into Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code." 94 Although acknowledging that the ultimate
aim of the process Js a "successful rehabilitation," the Court
recognized that "[d]etermining what would constitute a successful
rehabilitation involves balancing the interests of the affected
parties-the debtor, creditors, and employees."95 It therefore
concluded that the bankruptcy court must be free, in this context,
to determine what constitutes a "successful rehabilitation" and
thus to evaluate which particular aims, among the competing
aims, most deserve recognition in any particular bankruptcy
case. 96
Accordingly, the Court in Bildisco adopted an alternative rule
designed to preserve this latitude. 7 According to this rule, the
bankruptcy court may reject the collective-bargaining agreement
if it finds "that the collective-bargaining agreement burdens the
estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the equities balance in
favor of rejecting the labor contract."98 In balancing the equities,
the bankruptcy court should not restrict itself to the question of
whether rejection is needed to prevent the debtor's liquidation.
It should consider the interests of the various parties to the
reorganization, including creditors and both unionized and non-
unionized employees, and take into account "any qualitative dif-
ferences between the types of hardships each may face."' ' Through
this wide-ranging deliberation, the court may achieve an informed
perspective as to the likely impact of its decision on the parti-
an unfair labor practice when it unilaterally rejects or modifies a collective-bargaining
agreement prior to formal approval by the bankruptcy court. Id at 527. The Court held
that, because filing of the bankruptcy petition renders the agreement "no longer imme-
diately enforceable," id. at 532, the NLRB was barred from seeking to enforce the
contract by charging the debtor-in-possession with an unfair labor practice, id. at 532.
92. Id. at 525.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id at 527.
95. I&
97. Id at 526.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 527.
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cipants in this case. This perspective allows the court to evaluate
the specific aims that vie for recognition in the estate's long-
term plan.
Still, even in balancing equities, the court remains within the
framework of rational constraint. Although no normative con-
straint operates to settle all the aims and thus to direct the court
to a specific outcome, the court remains subject to related nor-
mative constraints that express and order aims that are associ-
ated with its ultimate decision. Under such related normative
constraints, for example, the court may be required to dismiss
the petition of a debtor who seeks bankruptcy relief without any
legitimate intention to reorganize or liquidate, but having the
sole purpose of rejecting a collective-bargaining agreement. 00 The
court also is bound, subject to important exceptions, to respect
the substantive nonbankruptcy rights of the unionized employees
and other participants.1 1 In choosing among conflicting aims, the
court is not in a normative vacuum but reaches its decision
within the confines of strongly held values recognized under
bankruptcy law.10 2
The court's equitable decisionmaking is also answerable to
principles of rational choice, which define the outer boundaries
of rational decisionmaking.10 3 Its decision in this context is only
100. See 11 U.S.C. S 1112(b) (1988) (authorizing dismissal of reorganization case "for
cause"); see also Frank R. Kennedy, Creative Bankruptcy? Use and Abuse of the Bankruptcy
Law-Reflection on Some Recent Cases, 71 IowA L. REv. 199, 213 (1985) (indicating that
courts have authority to dismiss reorganization petitions filed to achieve improper purpose
of evadiuig a collective-bargaining agreement). As a further related normative constraint,
a court may be required to appoint a trustee or examiner for cause, including the fraud
or dishonesty of current management. See 11 U.S.C.. 1104 (1988).
101. For example, unionized employees retain their right to strike, and the rejection
of the agreement does not warrant the issuance by the bankruptcy court of an injunction
against such action. See Briggs Transp. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 739 F.2d
341 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 917 (1984).
102. In Bildisco, the Court itself imposed requirements that represent related normative
constraints on the bankruptcy court's decisionmaking. For example, the Court held that
the bankruptcy court, before permitting rejection, must be satisfied "that reasonable
efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification have been made and are not likely to produce
a prompt and satisfactory solution." Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 526. This constraint assures
that the bankruptcy court's decision will not undercut certain aims associated with
encouraging industrial self-regulation in the workplace.
103. Under the Bildisco approach, the bankruptcy court's decision is also subject to
basic rules that represent concrete instances of these principles of rational choice. For
instance, the reorganizing debtor has the burden of showing that rejection is necessary
for a successful reorganization, and the court must "make a reasoned finding on the
record why it has determined that rejection should be permitted." Id. at 527. This
requirement forces the court to clarify which aims are most important and subjects those
deliberations to judicial review.
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part of a larger deliberative process culminating in the realization
of a long-term plan. As the Court in Bildisco recognized, "The
Bankruptcy Code does not authorize freewheeling consideration
of every conceivable equity, but rather only how the equities
relate to the success of the reorganization."'1 4 If possible, the
court seeks to realize a long-term plan that not only orchestrates
the current demands of various participants but, through the
continuation of the corporate enterprise, creates a workable basis
for accommodating future demands as well.
In balancing the equities, a court must thus consider how its
decision in the immediate context will affect the range of aims
that will be possible later on. As one consideration, the reorgan-
izing debtor's rejection of a collective-bargaining agreement may
pave the way for constructive negotiation among all the parties
to the case. This negotiation may culminate in a long-term plan
for accommodating the demands of other employees, creditors,
shareholders, management, and the community as a whole. Like
a person coordinating her activities to leave open possible lives
as a musician and lawyer,1 5 the court seeks to move toward
defining the aims of the enterprise without foreclosing attainment
of potentially important future aims.
Nonetheless, the flexibility that the court enjoys in coordinat-
ing aims may appear to invite abuse. Because -a court may
rationally favor reorganization over liquidation in many circum-
stances, it might exhibit an undue bias toward solutions that
create added insurance against liquidation. When confronted with
the cumulative demands of those constituencies favoring rejection
against the sole union opposing rejection, the judge also may be
influenced by the appearance of a consensus and discount the
importance of upholding collective-bargaining agreements. If these
particular aspects of its decision are not subject to specific
constraints embodied in bankruptcy law, the court may make
mistakes without violating any specific bankruptcy rule or com-
mitting reversible error.
Equitable decisionmaking, then, does introduce certain identi-
fiable risks; but the existence of these specific and limited risks
in this particular context does not mean that bankruptcy deci-
sionmaking as a whole is somehow "irrational." Bankruptcy law
supplies a rational foundation for bankruptcy decisionmaking.
Precisely because bankruptcy law has a rational foundation, bank-
104. I&
105. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
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ruptcy critics are able to speak meaningfully of "mistakes" in
bankruptcy. As a corrective to any identifiable risk of error,
Congress need not impose a reductive method that forces courts
to observe the dictates of economic theory. Instead, it may refine
bankruptcy law as a response to financial distress by building
upon the immanent rationality that bankruptcy law itself affords.
As one means of reducing the chance of error in this context,
Congress might modify the relevant normative constraints, en-
acting additional rules that express general or specific aims.
These enactments need not settle all the aims relevant to the
court's decision, however. Congress may provide further norma-
tive guidance while preserving a significant measure of flexibility;
it may enact rules that embody related normative constraints
that do not determine the court's decision, but do exclude certain
aims from recognition. Moreover, whatever the nature of the
normative constraints imposed, Congress may adjust the relevant
deliberative constraints, enacting rules that operate as concrete
instances of principles of rational choice. Congress thus reforms
bankruptcy law not by locating a reductive method of deciding
all bankruptcy questions, but by adjusting the constraints by
which bankruptcy decisionmaking in a particular context is guided.
Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code,10 enacted within months
after Bildisco'017 and after intense lobbying by various labor
groups,05 provides a good example of how meaningful bankruptcy
reform is possible.' 9 First, it embodies normative constraints to
106. 11 U.S.C. S 1113 (1988).
107. Section 1113 was enacted on July 10, 1984, as Subtitle J of the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 390-91.
108. See William Serrin, Labor Leaders Voice Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1984, at 46.
109. Like any statute governing a controversial and difficult problem, S 1113 may well
have practical flaws. Commentators have argued, for example, that the provision was
inadequately drafted and that courts have misapplied the provision. See, e.g., Anne J.
McClain, Note, Bankruptcy Code Section 1113 and the Simple Rejection of Collective
Bargaining Agreements: Labor Loses Again, 80 GEO. L.J. 191, 206-10 (1991) (contending
that courts have misinterpreted and manipulated what was intended as a pro-labor staute
to defeat labor interests). In addition, S 1113 has complex practical origins, having been
enacted in a highly politicized context and in a hurried manner. See, e.g., Rosalind
Rosenberg, Bankruptcy and the Collective Bargaining Agreement: A Brief Lesson in the
Use of the Constitutional System of Checks and Balances, 58 Am. BANKR. L.J. 293, 312-21
(1984) (describing the political process culminating in the enactment of 5 1113). None of
these factors, however, undercuts my basic point that bankruptcy reform reveals the
workings of normative and deliberative constraints. A statute such as § 1113 may display
the workings of rational constraints, even though it may represent an imperfect embod-
iment of those constraints or may be misapplied in practice. The question of whether, in
principle, bankruptcy legislation has rational foundations is distinct from the question of
whether the practical origins or practical application of the statute is itself rational.
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promote certain strongly held values associated with the integrity
of collective-bargaining agreements. In addition to requiring that
the "balance of equities clearly favor[] rejection,"110  1113 de-
mands that the court find that the reorganizing debtor bargained
in good faith to reach a negotiated settlement with the union."'
It regulates that bargaining process, requiring, among other
things, that the debtor-in-possession present to the union a pro-
posal for modifications, containing only "necessary modifications"
that are "necessary" to the reorganization. 12 This rule forces the
reorganizing debtor to limit the kinds of modifications that it
might seek through rejection. Although this rule does not defin-
itively settle the aims in favor of upholding collective-bargaining
agreements," 3 it does embody related normative constraints that
encourage industrial self-regulation and discourage strategic use
of the reorganization process to undercut union representation.
Furthermore, by demanding that the court determine that
certain bargaining requirements have been met before allowing
rejection, § 1113 includes concrete instances of principles of ra-
tional choice that guide the court in formulating a long-term plan.
Whatever the substantive progress resulting from the parties'
negotiation, both sides may have at least expressed their dis-
agreement and, to some extent, explored its implications. In
determining whether the bargaining requirements have been
satisfied, the court gains insight into the nature of the demands
110. 11 U.S.C. S 1113(cX3).
111. See ic. S 1113(b), (c). However, in those cases in which modification of the agreement
prior to the hearing on rejection is "essential to the continuation of the debtor's business,
or in order to avoid irreparable damage to the estate," id. S 1113(e), the court may order
such interim relief without these findings, id.
112. Id. S 1113(bX1XA).
113. Most courts have interpreted the "necessary" requirement consistently with the
basic approach in Bildisco, requiring only that the modifications proposed be necessary
for the debtor's "long-term" survival. See, e.g., In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc., 899 F.2d
887(10th Cir. 1990) (holding that a modification proposal places the burden on the debtor
of proving that the proposal is made in good faith and that it contains necessary, but
not absolutely minimal, changes that will enable the debtor to successfully reorganize);
Truck Drivers Local 807, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Carey Transp., Inc., 816 F.2d 82 (2d
Cir. 1987) (holding that "necessary" does not mean essential or bare minimum, but puts
on the debtor the burden of proving that its proposal was made in good faith). Such
courts interpret S 1113 as leaving the competing aims largely unsettled and thus have
continued to exercise considerable latitude in moving toward a long-term plan that might
accommodate diverse aims. See, e.g., Mile High Metal Sys., 899 F.2d at 890-93. Other
courts, however, have read the requirement more strictly. See, e.g., Wheeling-Pittsburgh
Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1088-89 (3d Cir. 1986) (requiring that
the proposal contain only modifications absolutely required for the debtor's short-term
survival).
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asserted by each side. This deliberation may clarify the potential
consequences of its decision for the participants that the decision
will affect. The court thus stands in a better position to evaluate
the benefits and risks of its decisionmaking, and to reach an
outcome that is less likely to offend principles of rational choice.
These bargaining requirements also may have the effect of
easing the court's task in coordinating the realization of conflict-
ing aims. Obligated to bargain in good faith, the reorganizing
debtor and the union may in fact work out some of their differ-
ences before the time for hearing. When the time of hearing
arrives, the court then will be faced with alternatives that are
less dramatically divided. If the court approves rejection, the
reorganizing debtor and union at least have a starting point for
renegotiation that the court may enforce; and if the court denies
rejection, the union may have already made concessions. With
the divergence of possible aims somewhat narrowed, the court
may be more likely to locate a creative solution that accommo-
dates the competing aims as part of a long-term plan.
Section 1113 thus exemplifies the workings of bankruptcy
criticism. It addresses the worries created by the court's balanc-
ing of equities, not by repudiating the court's equitable power,
but by adjusting the constraints to which bankruptcy decision-
making is subject. Although § 1113 embodies normative con-
straints that limit the kinds of aims that a court may recognize,
it also includes deliberative constraints that support the court in
exercising its remaining flexibility to the greatest advantage.
The court may continue to work toward defining the aims that
are most important in a particular case, progressing toward a
long-term plan that is suited to the values and concerns of those
it must govern.
In this context as well as others, the rule of equity has an
essential role in bankruptcy decisionmaking. It allows a court to
respond to an inescapable clash between strongly held values by
mediating their relationship in the context of a particular bank-
ruptcy case. This kind of flexibility creates a possibility that a
normative constraint definitively ranking the aims would have
foreclosed: the court may develop a creative solution that accom-
modates a range of divergent demands.
Even subject to these additional constraints, however, a court's
decisionmaking must remain, at least to some degree, indeter-
minate. In a particular case, a court may abuse its flexibility and
reach a decision that ignores important values or recognizes
unimportant ones. The alternative, however, is much worse; it
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would be to constrain courts from recognizing the values that
are most important in responding to financial distress. The small
pockets of indeterminacy are the price we pay for decisionmaking
that is suited to the character of the problem it seeks to address.
III. CONCLUSION
This Article addresses perhaps the most important concern for
a value-based account of bankruptcy law: can bankruptcy deci-
sionmaking among diverse values be rational? The worry, as I
suggested earlier, may be posed in the form of a dilemma.114 We
are forced, it may seem, to choose between the economic account's
method for bankruptcy decisionmaking that is rational but not
good, and value-based methods for decisionmaking that are good
but not rational."5
This Article proves that this dilemma is illusory, for each of
its horns is in error. First, the economic account's method of
decisionmaking is neither good nor fully rational. To be rational,
bankruptcy decisionmaking must be appropriate to the character
of the problem to be addressed. Although the economic account's
method may be suited to solve a purely economic problem, it is
entirely unsuited to resolve practical conflicts among diverse and
incommensurable values that pervade financial distress. Thus, its
reductive method is not fully rational for the same reason that
it is not good: it fails to offer the kind of rational guidance that
decisionmaking requires to respond to the human problem of
financial distress.
A means of achieving rationality in bankruptcy decisionmaking
exists. The second horn of the dilemma is also mistaken: value-
based methods of bankruptcy decisionmaking are both good and
rational. Bankruptcy law embodies normative and deliberative
constraints that guide the court in rationally resolving conflicts
among diverse human values. In some contexts, the relevant
constraints may direct the court to pursue those aims that reflect
our firm and unqualified commitments. When our commitments
are less clearly defined, however, the court appropriately retains
some measure of latitude, within a framework of constraint, to
reach decisions attuned to the particular characteristics of the
bankruptcy case. In either event, we need not resort to the
severe logic of the economic account to determine the limits of
114. See supra text accompanying notes 1-16.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
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bankruptcy decisionmaking. Bankruptcy law itself has abundant
resources for offering a kind of rationality that is suited to the
human crisis of financial distress.
